> In fact, a system where you can lose your life savings if you forget your key or download a piece of malware is not particularly trustworthy. No amount of explaining how SHA-256 works to prevent double-spending will fix that.
A second-layer solution, built on top of bitcoin, that would allow transactions to be reversed by a central authority, if a person decided to place their trust in that authority, could fix that, though.
This is the problem with the article: it doesn't take into account bitcoin's ability to change. It's like Schneier is saying the internet will never work because dial-up modems are slow and hog your phone line.
He's assuming no further innovation will occur. And like the early internet, it's practically impossible to predict what cryptocurrencies will look like in a few decades.
What is worry? It is when you're compelled to react to a thought with more thoughts. The response is habitual. You cannot let the thoughts sail by without commenting on them.
So the real question is not how to stop worrying, but how to weaken the habit of reacting to specific thoughts.
I think takes time to find an approach that works -- to discover how to both weaken the habit and how to not strengthen it. It's a lifestyle change. Some trial and error is probably necessary.
I don't think there is a magic solution. Try various things, learn how your current mental life causes you to worry. You'll try something, and your worries might increase. So try something else. And when you notice that some change, after some time, has caused you to worry slightly less, stick with it.
> Unfortunately instead of sticking to ethics, morality, and other hazy constructs, too often philosophers think they have something useful to say about everything.
They do have something useful to say about people who, due to not having studied philosophy of science, think science has something useful to say about everything. Sam Harris's The Moral Landscape is one notable recent example.
Are you saying that you believe Richard Feynman didn’t have a working grasp of the issues at hand? Or are you saying that “philosophers of science” don’t know anything about the science they philosophize about? I’d guess that Feynman was more familiar with the philosophy of science, than the philosophers were with path integral formulations.
As for science, it’s a method, and it can be applied to anything. What it says may often be, “don’t know” which imo is better than 100 pages saying “don’t know, but I’ll give it a go anyway, because no one can prove me wrong yet.”
> Are you saying that you believe Richard Feynman didn’t have a working grasp of the issues at hand? Or are you saying that “philosophers of science” don’t know anything about the science they philosophize about?
I'm saying that understanding things like what the scientific method can and can't do is useful to a scientist because, if they don't understand the distinction, they might try to use the scientific method to prove something it cannot.
> As for science, it’s a method, and it can be applied to anything. What it says may often be, “don’t know” which imo is better than 100 pages saying “don’t know, but I’ll give it a go anyway, because no one can prove me wrong yet.”
While you might try to apply the scientific method to anything, that doesn't mean it is useful for everything. For example, if something isn't replicable, then the scientific method cannot help you. You cannot scientifically prove what effect the Battle of Hastings had on Britain.
I can’t prove that, but could a sufficiently powerful AI prove it? Probably. The open questions for philosophy are a function of our present limitations, and as those limitations are overcome, the space for philosophy shrinks. I don’t think it says much that’s good about a field of study for which the major criteria is untestability and immunity from definitive critique.
I don't think that's a very accurate view of the field. If modern analytical philosophy values anything, it's logic (especially the formal variety), and I can think of at least a few dominant views in the last few decades that were felled by someone pointing out a bug in the underlying logic.
I don't think the philosophical questions are functions of our present limitations either. Imagine knowing everything about all people, and complete God-like power. Do you maximize utility? Do you equalize utility? Do you maximin? Do you ignore utility entirely, and move on some other criteria? You might have all the "is", but the "ought" is still an important question (and, importantly, not a relative one! Despite not being empirical) [1]
> The open questions for philosophy are a function of our present limitations, and as those limitations are overcome, the space for philosophy shrinks. I don’t think it says much that’s good about a field of study for which the major criteria is untestability and immunity from definitive critique.
I'd agree that there are sections of the philsophic community that rely on that immunity. But other parts of the philosophy community perform an important role of teaching the philosophic foundations on which things like the scientific method are built. This is an important fight on which the effective practice of science itself depends.
Corporations and governments increasingly try to manipulate the scientific community for their own ends, giving rise to scientism. Consider stories like this: http://www.bmj.com/content/345/bmj.e4737
Furthermore, philosophy teaches people how to think critically and how to express themselves accurately and unambiguously, to challenge the prevailing beliefs around them. I think philosophy is far from a pointless old field that needs to shut up shop. In fact, I think societies would benefit if more people studied philosophy and at a younger age.
> The core ideas in philosophy could be summarized on one page with little information loss. This probably seems horribly arrogant, but that's just how I honestly see things.
I think academic philosphy aims to be more rigourous, so while such a summary might capture the broad points, it will miss the nuance.
A comparison could be made with a game of Chess. On the surface, you could describe a game in terms of the moves played, but to understand why those moves were played, you need to know about the potential moves that weren't played.
I can understand why some people criticise academic philosophy for exploring seemingly pointless details extensively, but such exploration always gives someone a richer understanding, and sometimes uncovers flaws in things that previously seemed unquestionable. I think this is what people don't appreciate: understanding the moves played doesn't mean you understand why those moves were played, the ocean of possiblities underneath. No one page summary will do that, for Chess or philosophy.
But I guess if we accepted that, nobody would be to blame.