I don't understand why requiring an action which is feasible today implies that this action must be kept feasible in the future. If the FBI demands that you open a door for them, does that imply you're not allowed to brick up the entrance later on?
It implies that, because the power to require Apple to take action today is on the same side of Rubicon as requiring them to take some other action in the future.
Once we permit the FBI to task private companies via court order, there's no way to predict how far that tasking will be permitted to go.
> If the FBI demands that you open a door for them, does that imply you're not allowed to brick up the entrance later on?
The FBI is not demanding that Apple open a door, it is demanding that Apple build a custom software system for them. If the FBI can tell Apple how to build software today, then the FBI can probably tell Apple how to build software tomorrow.
The FBI isn't quite telling Apple how to build software in general. They're trying to make Apple build a specific piece of software for the FBI.
If they do this today, they can probably do it tomorrow, yes. But "this" doesn't mean compromising all iPhone hardware or software. It means building a special copy of the software to attack already insecure hardware and software.
Let's say Apple makes the iPhone 7 completely invulnerable to attack even from Apple. How does this precedent play out? The FBI goes to Apple and says, "Do that thing you did before." Apple replies, "Sorry, but we literally can't do it for this phone." How does the existing precedent cause a problem?
This whole line of argument feels too much like, "The FBI can demand something, this is something, therefore the FBI can demand this." People keep saying there's a connection and I just don't see it. When I ask what it is, people just reiterate that it's there.
Then they request a warrant that requires future iOS versions to permit similar access.
By what argument would Apple fight that warrant? The previous case would have already established that such access is necessary, that Apple can provide it, and that the court has the legal power to force them to.
In terms of the burden on Apple, the staff time burden to write software that will run on 50 million iPhones is no greater than software that will run on one iPhone. Code is code.
In terms of damage to the Apple brand, the FBI has already argued that that should not matter:
That warrant isn't targeted and affects Apple customers who are unrelated to any criminal investigation. I see no reason why it would be granted.
Consider more traditional warrants. The police ask for a warrant to search your house. They get that warrant. Then afterwards they ask for another warrant, this time to enter everybody's house. Does the precedent set by the first warrant make a judge likely to grant the second one? I don't think so. Certainly I've never heard of any such warrant being issued by an American court (excluding the ridiculous FISA court, anyway), even though police would surely love to have one, and the precedent of search warrants for individual houses is extremely long standing.
