Wasn't the idea that they wanted to avoid pilot re-training? So if pilots would be expected to counteract manually, they would have to train to understand when to do that.
Pilots are already trained to handle runaway trim, the idea was that an MCAS failure would behave similarly and the same checklist they already trained on could be used. Due to issues in how MCAS was implemented however, the behavior was different from runaway trim and more confusing.
> with Boeing aircraft when the autopilot is off you're fully manual
The 777 and 787 are full-time FBW, there is no manual reversion. There is no way to move the control surfaces directly. The only difference with the AP engaged is the origin of the control demands.
You can have cables, push rods, hydraulics, power assisted hydraulics, full hydraulic, and electrical actuators. As long as their control inputs are only from the pilot they are identical in every way but their failure modes.
There is big big difference between FBW and the aircraft generating control inputs on it's own. Boeing aircraft had two modes, 'manual' and 'auto pilot' The 737 MAX adds a third case, 'sometimes'
Boeing never told the pilots about the 'sometimes' part. And never told them that 'sometimes' has ultimately more control authority than they do.
I think you misunderstood my post. There is literally NO manual command over control surfaces in any current Boeing airliner other than the 737 variants. Neither the 777 nor 787 have any pushrods or cables.
The Max does indeed have a hybrid approach ( manual actuation, FBW spoilers, mystery MCAS ) but that's not Boeing's current philosophy.
