The fact that the experiment takes places in Germany doesn't necessarily mean that the results apply exclusively to basic income in Germany for Germans.
How to better distribute income and how to deal with income inequality are definitely important topics, but that doesn't mean that all research on wealth distribution has to stop there.
I don't think that's a fair representation of the ancient Roman combination social welfare and grain price stabilization system or of the role slaves had in Roman society.
I am not sure if I agree with his conclusion, but some economists are of the opinion that countries in Northern Europe used the euro as a political tool to protect their own internal markets by making goods produced in the poorer countries of the Eurozone less competitive. If a country’s government could previously deflate their own currency to make their exports more attractive, they cannot do it anymore since they joined the Eurozone.
OK, I've heard of the second part about being unable to devalue the Euro because it basically reflects the economic power of the Eurozone as a whole and that e.g. Greece leaving the Eurozone could have helped Greece in 2008. But as a whole I'd guess that especially export-focused Eurozone members like Germany would welcome a depreciation of the Euro. At the very least I think they would not try to bolster it.
It does, however, not bring me any closer to understanding the "exporting unemployment" statement. I guess it is some kind of multi-step reasoning that is eluding me, or maybe it is an example of a control illusion? I don't know.
> But as a whole I'd guess that especially export-focused Eurozone members like Germany would welcome a depreciation of the Euro.
Yes, but only if it is guaranteed that their imports would depreciate similarly. Otherwise, say, Germany would devalue the Deutsche Mark but then run into the risk of importing produce from The Netherlands at a higher cost.
> It does, however, not bring me any closer to understanding the "exporting unemployment" statement.
The monetary policy after the 2008 crisis forced poor countries to cut public spending so that industrial economies could be bailed out. As a metaphor, the potentially unemployed factory worker from Germany was replaced an actual unemployed public service worker in Greece.
It’s supposed to be paid for by people who’d rather work to earn just a bit more than UBI than do nothing and get paid, obviously.
The fundamental problem with UBI, like every other feel-good economic initiative, is that its proponents make poor assumptions about how the people who stand to benefit will behave — see all the predictions that the folks currently working in fast food or Walmart will magically turn into entrepreneurs or usher in a golden age of art if they simply had $1000 per month in cash. It’s noble to think the best of others, but they just kind of hand wave away the reality that there’s a non-trivial population that aspires to do nothing more than consume drugs and/or play video games for their entire lives. It’s not everyone obviously, but it’s enough to be a problem. Doubly so when you consider they could become a sizable voting bloc that will continue to vote for whoever promises to increase UBI.
When people dismiss UBI studies that last for just a few years and target a small slice of the population, it’s precisely because these long term negative effects take time and people to play out.
